This paper considers the potential for the cultural transmission of attitudes toward work, welfare, and individual responsibility to explain the intergenerational correlation in welfare receipt. Specifically, we examine whether mothers and their 18-yearold children share similar attitudes towards social benefits and social inequality as well as whether these attitudes differ by patterns of welfare receipt. We find evidence in support of the cultural transmission of work-welfare attitudes from mothers to children. Young people are significantly more likely to support the public-provision of generous unemployment benefits and believe that social inequality is driven by factors outside the individual's control as their mothers' support for these views increases. Youths' work-welfare attitudes are also related to the welfare histories of their families, but not to the welfare experiences of other young people in their neighborhoods.
Introduction
Social assistance programs affect individual and household behavior by altering the economic incentives to engage in certain labor market activities (e.g. employment or job search), pursue educational or training opportunities, and adopt particular family structures. Welfare may also influence behavior by changing the attitudes or preferences of welfare recipients. This possibility has led to concerns that the welfare system itself may produce a culture of dependence that results in welfare dependency being passed from one generation to the next. In particular, the concern is that growing up in families or in neighborhoods heavily reliant on social assistance alters children's preferences by weakening their work ethic and reducing the stigma associated with welfare receipt. Alternatively, exposure to welfare as a child may reduce the information costs associated with accessing the social assistance system. This notion of a welfare culture has its antecedents in theories of poverty cultures from the 1960s and attributes welfare dependency to the values and attitudes that children learn from their parents and neighbors (see Duncan et al. 1988; Patterson 1986; Corcoran 1995; Gottschalk 2005; Bartholomae et al. 2004 ). As such, intergenerational welfare dependency represents a form of cultural transmission in which preferences, beliefs, and norms of behavior develop through social interactions both across and within generations.
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Although a vast literature documents that welfare receipt is correlated across generations, 2 this is not in itself evidence that parents' welfare receipt causes their children to have a higher probability of accessing the welfare system. Rather this correlation could stem from a correlation in the underlying social, economic, psychological, or geographic factors that lead parents and their children to have similar propensities to be poor-and therefore to need social assistance. Identification of the causal effect of parental welfare receipt is generally achieved through a combination of exclusion restrictions, an intergenerational 1 Bowles (1998) and Bisin and Verdier (2008) discuss the process of cultural transmission generally, while Verdier (2001, 2004) , Bisin et al. (2006) , and Patacchini and Zenou (2007) develop theoretical models of cultural transmission. The empirical evidence on cultural transmission is somewhat limited, but nonetheless suggests that interactions within families and local communities play a role in shaping individuals' identities (Bisin et al. 2006 ) and educational outcomes (Edwards et al. 2001) .
2 See for example, Duncan et al. (1988) , Antel (1992) , Moffitt (1992) , Gottschalk (1990 Gottschalk ( , 1992 Gottschalk ( , 1996 , Borjas and Sueyoshi (1997) , Pepper (2000) , Beaulieu et al. (2005) , Levine and Zimmerman (2005) ; McCoull (1998, 2000) .
ordering assumption (i.e. by assuming parents affect children but not the reverse), and the use of information about the timing of benefit receipt and specific outcomes (see Gottschalk 1996; Pepper 2000; Beaulieu et al. 2005) . The overarching conclusion from these studies is that while some of the intergenerational correlation in social assistance receipt is spurious, there is also evidence of a causal link.
Unfortunately, we are left with something of a black box. Previous research has not specifically assessed whether any causal effect of parents' welfare receipt on their children's welfare receipt operates by altering children's preferences for work versus welfare or through some other mechanism. In order for the welfare culture model to find support in the data it must be the case that: 1) welfare receipt alters the work-welfare attitudes of parents and/or their children; and 2) that these attitudes are related to subsequent outcomes.
While there is some evidence that welfare receipt is related to psycho-social characteristics like self-esteem (Elliott 1996) or locus of control (Gottschalk 2005) , it is less clear that people's beliefs or values can be linked to their subsequent welfare receipt (Greenwell et al. 1998; Edwards et al. 2001; Bartholomae et al. 2004) or that they can be linked across generations.
Our objective is to investigate whether the cultural transmission of a weak work ethicor alternatively welfare acceptance-from parents to children might be responsible for producing an intergenerational welfare culture. Specifically, is there a relationship between the work-welfare attitudes of mothers and their adult children? Does this relationship depend on the family's previous interaction with the welfare system or on the welfare profile of the surrounding neighborhood? We address these questions by first developing a theoretical framework to illustrate the cultural transmission of work attitudes across generations.
We then use this framework to specify and estimate a structural equation model of young people's work-welfare attitudes. The data come from the Youth in Focus Project which interviewed approximately 2400 pairs of youths (aged 18 in 2006) and their mothers about their attitudes towards work, welfare, and what it takes to get ahead in life. These survey data are linked to almost twelve years of administrative welfare data for these families.
Our results provide evidence for the cultural transmission of work-welfare attitudes from mothers to children. Young people are significantly more likely to support the publicprovision of generous unemployment benefits and believe that social inequality is driven by factors outside the individual's control as their mothers' support for these views increases.
Youths' work-welfare attitudes are also related to the welfare histories of their families, but not to the welfare experiences of other young people in their neighborhoods.
A Model of Cultural Transmission of Values

Transition probabilities and parents' utility function
We begin by developing a model which illustrates the intergenerational transmission of work attitudes. As in Bisin and Verdier (2001) , we assume that individuals are influenced by both their parents and the neighborhoods in which they live. Specifically, each family consists of one parent and a child. There are two types of parents. Type L has a high marginal utility of leisure, (i.e., low work ethic) while type H has a low marginal utility of leisure (i.e., high work ethic). Parents have a total time endowment of one unit which they allocate to leisure and labor supply, l i .
We assume that parents do not know the exact wage rate they will face in the labor market when they make their labor supply decisions. This allows us to capture the effect of exogenous labor market shocks on outcomes. The uncertainty regarding wages is resolved after the labor supply choice is made. Each parent independently draws a wage w from a common distribution F with support in [w, w] and density f .
Parents are expected utility maximizers. The expected utility a parent of type i receives from consumption and leisure can be written as
where c i (w) stands for the consumption level for a given wage rate w, l i captures parents' labor supply choice, and γ i ∈ [0, 1] denotes parents' work ethic. The utility received from leisure is given by (1 − γ i ) Z (1 − l i ) which is a strictly concave and increasing function with Z (0) = ∞ and Z (1) = 0. We assume that γ H > γ L which is consistent with parents with a higher work ethic having a lower taste for leisure.
Parents also care about their children's utility. Children are born without any inclinations and are shaped by their parents and the environment. Let q ij for i, j ∈ {L, H} be the probability that a child with a parent of type i has values of type j. We assume that four things affect children's values: parental labor supply (l i ), parental work ethic (γ i ), the parent's experience with the welfare system, and the proportion of people in the neighborhood with a strong work ethic (σ). Parents are successful in passing a strong work ethic on to their children with a probability that is proportional to their labor supply choice. However, a working parent with a weak work ethic is less convincing than a working parent with a strong work ethic. This may be because those parents with a weak work ethic complain more about work, which makes them less effective in passing a strong work ethic on to their children. Moreover, we assume that parents who have received welfare find it more difficult to transfer a high work ethic on to their children irrespective of their own work ethic.
Specifically, for a parent of type i, where i ∈ {l, H}, the probability of passing a strong work ethic is given by δ k γ i l i , where k ∈ {s, ns} denotes whether the family has ever received support (s) or not (ns). We assume that δ s < δ ns = 1. If the parent is not successful in passing on a strong work ethic (with probability 1 − δγ i l i ), then the child is randomly matched with somebody in the neighborhood. The greater the proportion of people in the neighborhood with a strong work ethic (σ), the higher the chances the child will develop a strong work ethic through a neighbor with a strong work ethic. Thus, the child's overall probability of having a strong work ethic is given
if the parent has a strong work ethic and
if the parent has a weak work ethic. Given the assumption that γ H > γ L , these expressions imply that it is easier for type H parents to pass a strong work ethic on to their children.
The child will have a weak work ethic if both the parent and society were unsuccessful in passing a strong work ethic on to the child. The probability of having a child with a weak work ethic is given by
and
for the type H and type L parent, respectively.
As in Bisin and Verdier (2001) , parents are altruistic, but in a paternalistic way. That is, they correctly anticipate their children's future labor supply behavior, but they evaluate their children's future utility from their own perspective. Let
represent the expected altruistic utility a parent of type i receives if her child is of type j. Since the utility of the child is evaluated from the perspective of the parent, V ij is a function of the parent's taste parameter, γ i , and the child's optimal labor supply choice,
where c C * j (w) stands for the optimal consumption choice of the child for a given wage rate, w. Note that if γ i = γ C j , a parent of type i's altruistic utility is maximized when
reflects the parent's expected utility gain if her child has the same work ethic as herself.
We can now write the expected utility of a parent of type i as
where i, j ∈ {H, L} and k ∈ {s, ns} as above. Note that q k ii and q k ij may take on different values depending on the realization of w since the parent may receive welfare in some states of the world but not in others.
Parents maximize their expected utility by choosing l i subject to their budget constraint.
We assume that individuals qualify for (and receive) welfare if their income falls below y.
With a means-tested benefit system and a taper rate of b, the level of welfare received is
A parent who has chosen a high level of labor supply may still receive welfare if the wage realization is sufficiently low. As a result, for a given choice of l i , the budget constraint is given by
Analysis
The transition probabilities defined in equations 1-4 imply that the likelihood that children will have a strong work ethic is increasing in the amount of time their parents' work. In other words, ∂q Hence, an increase in the proportion of people in the neighborhood with a strong work ethic has an ambiguous impact on the attitudes of the children of strong work ethic parents, but increases the probability that a weak work ethic parent has a child with strong work ethic.
Empirical predictions
To summarize, the key feature of the model is that children's attitudes are shaped by socialization both inside and outside the family. We find that parents with a strong work ethic are more likely to have children with a strong work ethic. Children are also more likely to have strong work ethic if their parents work harder and do not receive welfare.
Moreover, although a stronger neighborhood work ethic has an ambiguous impact on the attitudes of the children of parents with a strong work ethic, it increases the probability that parents with a weak work ethic have children that develops a strong work ethic.
The Data
The Youth in Focus Data
We use data from the Youth in Focus Project (YIF) to estimate the relationship between young people's work-welfare attitudes and those of their mothers taking into account the family's welfare history.
3
The YIF data are unique in providing detailed information about attitudes toward work and welfare, welfare histories, and family background for a matched sample of mothers' and their 18-year-old children.
Specifically, the YIF Project uses Australian administrative social security records to identify all young people born in the six-month period between October 1987 and March 1988 who ever had contact with the social security system between 1993 and 2005 (see Breunig et al. 2007 for details). These social security records provide high-quality, fortnightly data on the payment details for the universe of Australians receiving a wide range of social benefits. Although young people can appear in the administrative data if they receive social security payments themselves, most enter the system because a family member (generally a parent) received a payment which depended in part on the youth's relationship to the payee. Many families at some point received a benefit, e.g., unemployment benefits or sole parent payments, that is best thought of as welfare, however, approximately 40 percent of families did not. They received only a family tax benefit or child care benefits during the period covered by our data. The family tax and the child care benefits are not consider as welfare payment by the Australian government, and we follow this definition in this paper.
4
The generosity of the Australian social security system implies that approximately 90 percent of young people in the relevant six-month birth cohort are represented in the administrative data.
5
The administrative data were used to categorize youths and their parents into one of six groups depending on the recency and intensity of the family's welfare receipt (see Appendix Table A1 ). A stratified random sample of young people and a corresponding parent or guardian-in 96.5 percent of cases the biological mother-was then selected from the administrative data for interview (see Breunig et al. 2007 ). Data from separate phone interviews with youth and their parents as well as a self-completion questionnaire administered to youth were then matched to the administrative social security data.
6
Of particular interest for this paper will be the comparison between the group of re-4 The Family Tax Benefit is essentially an income tax credit to families with children rather than a welfare payment. Currently a family with two children would receive a Family Tax Benefit for incomes up to $105,000 AUD.
5 In particular, the Australian social security system is nearly universal, with some benefits, e.g. Child Care Benefit, having no income test, and other benefits, e.g. Family Tax Benefit, being denied only to those households in the top 20 percent of the income distribution. See Centrelink (2007) for more information about the Australian social security system.
6 The survey response rate was 34.2 percent for parents, and 34.7 percent for youth -73.1 percent of whom also completed the self-completion questionnaire. More than 96 percent of young people and 92 percent of parents completing the survey consented to having this information liked to their administrative records.
spondents who have not received any welfare payments (stratum A), those who received welfare for six or more years (stratum B), and those who received welfare for less than six years (Strata C-F). We refer to these groups as recipients with no welfare history (the base group in our multivariate analyses), Intensive Welfare history, and Moderate Welfare History respectively. (Appendix Table A1 presents a detailed description of all six groups).
We have necessarily made a number of sample restrictions. We drop 74 pairs in which the responding parent was not the biological mother and 286 pairs in which either the youth or mother provided incomplete information. Consequently, our estimation sample consists of 2070 pairs of youth and their mothers who both have complete survey information for the variables of interest.
7
Summary statistics are presented by welfare history in Appendix Table A2 .
Work-Welfare Attitudes and Welfare History
Young people and their parents were asked for their views about the government's role in supporting the unemployed and what it takes to get ahead in life. Specifically, individuals were asked whether the government or unemployed individuals (and their families) themselves should mainly be responsible for ensuring that the unemployed have enough to live on and whether current unemployment benefits are too high or too low.
8
Individuals were also asked about the importance of having 1) well-educated parents, 2) a good education themselves, 3) ambition, and 4) a job in getting ahead in life.
9
Finally, parents were also asked about the importance of coming from a wealthy background. Responses to these questions form the basis of our work-welfare measures. Sabbagh and Vanhuysse (2006) argue that attitudes towards the welfare state can be understood in the context of two competing ideological frameworks; one based on markets and the other based on a welfare state. The market-based perspective is associated with a 7 In some specifications of our multivariate model our sample reduces to 1375 observations due to missing values in some of the mothers' attitudinal variables.
8 Possible responses are "benefits for unemployed people are too low and cause hardship" or "benefits for unemployed people are too high and discourage them from finding jobs." The wording for each question and variable definitions are shown in Appendix Table A3 .
9 Possible responses for this set of questions are "extremely important", "fairly important", "not to important", "doesn't matter at", and "undesirable, a bad thing". See Appendix Table A3 for details.
strong work ethic, a belief that individuals have the primary responsibility for their own welfare, and that it is individuals and their actions that drive social inequality. In contrast, the welfare-statist perspective is characterized by a desire for egalitarian redistribution, support for universal benefits, and a view that social inequality stems not from individuals' character defects, but from unconstrained market forces (see Sabbagh and Vanhuysse 2006) . Drawing upon this conceptual framework, we create for this section a series of seven indicator variables which take the value of one for responses that are consistent with the welfare-state frame and zero for responses that are consistent with the market-based frame (see Appendix Table A3 ). Weighted means, standard deviations, and p-values on tests for differences in mothers' and youths' mean responses are presented in Table 1 .
10
Mothers are significantly more likely than their 18 year old children to believe that unemployment benefits are too low and that the government has the responsibility to look after the unemployed. Almost two-thirds (62.0 percent) of mothers think that having a good education is very important in getting ahead in life, although only half (50.3 percent) of young people share this view. Rather, 18 year olds are significantly more likely to believe that it is having well-educated parents that leads to success in life. Mothers and youth appear to differ most in their perceptions of the importance of having a job in getting ahead in life with mothers being significantly more likely than their children (81.0 versus 59.0 percent) to see a job as very important. Both 18 year olds and mothers agree, however, that ones own ambition is very important in getting ahead. Finally, only 5.5 percent of mothers believe that life success is closely tied to coming from a wealthy background.
[ Table 1 here]
It is also interesting to begin to consider how attitudes towards work and welfare might be correlated within families. Table 2 reports youths' views conditional on those of their mothers. Specifically, 53.9 percent of young people believe that unemployment benefits are too low when their mother reports believing the same. Only 32.1 percent of youth think that unemployment benefits are too low when their mothers disagree with this viewpoint. This difference is highly significant. Overall, young people appear to be much more likely to 10 We use probability weights in order to account for sample stratification. adopt a particular work-welfare perspective when their mothers are of the same opinion with the correlation in mother and youth attitudes ranging from 0.322 (the level of unemployment benefits) to 0.098 (the importance of a job in getting ahead).
[ Table 2 here]
Perhaps not surprisingly, individuals' attitudes towards work and welfare also seem to be related to their families' exposure to the welfare system (see Table 3 ). Mothers and their 18-year-old children are both more likely to say that unemployment benefits are too low and that the government should look after the unemployed if the family has received welfare at some point in the past. For example, while 37.2 percent of young people in families with no exposure to the welfare system believe that benefits are too low the same is true of almost half (48.2 percent) of youth in families that received welfare at some point in the past. Young people are also significantly more likely to believe that the government should look after the unemployed when their families have a history of welfare receipt. We observe similar results for mothers. Still, the relationship between welfare history and perceptions of what it takes to get ahead in life is less clear cut. There is no significant relationship between welfare receipt and youths' views about the importance of various factors in achieving life success. In contrast, mothers with a history of welfare receipt are significantly more likely than those without to believe that having a good education, having a good job, and coming from a wealthy background are very important in getting ahead in life.
[ Table 3 Here ]
The Empirical Framework
Our interest is in understanding the extent to which work-welfare attitudes appear to be related to a family's welfare history. If the cultural transmission of work-welfare attitudes is at the heart of the intergenerational correlation in welfare receipt it must not only be true that young people share the attitudes of their parents, but also that the attitudes of youths who grow up in welfare recipient families are somehow worse than those of other people.
Additionally, youths whose parents work harder are also more likely to develop attitudes consistent with a higher work-ethic. In this section, we explore these relationships in more depth taking into account individual and neighborhood characteristics and accounting for the inter-related nature of our measure of work-welfare attitudes.
The Econometric Model
Our primary empirical challenge is to make the best use of the fact that we have multiple indicators of each individual's latent attitude towards work and welfare.
11
In this situation, the approach often taken in the economics literature is to aggregate the multiple indicators into a single index and then adopt an estimation strategy suitable for the latent-variable nature of the problem. However, in our case the weights underpinning the index would necessarily be ad hoc given that we have no information about the contribution that each makes in predicting attitudes toward work and welfare. Instead, we want to allow for the possibility that answers to our specific survey questions are only indicators of one or more broader concepts of work ethic and attitudes towards welfare. Moreover, we may be able to improve the precision of our estimates by combining the information from several indicators.
Consequently, we specify and estimate a model which consists of two parts. The first is a structural (behavioral) model of the relationship between youths' and mothers' latent work-welfare attitudes. The second is a measurement model which relates our observed responses (indicators) to the underlying latent variables (see Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2005; Ribar 2005; and Ribar et al. 2006) .
13
We discuss each in turn.
11 Specifically, there are six for youths and seven for their mothers. These will be used to estimated to independent models as explained below.
12 Summing them, for example, assigns each an equal weight. 13 The models we estimate have some similarities with the way James Heckman and coauthors study the relationship between cognitive and noncognitive abilities and labor market outcomes. In particular the way in which latent variables are treated by means of factor analytical models. See, for example, Heckman et al. (2006) .
Structural (Behavioral) Model
We model work-welfare attitudes for mother and youth as latent variables, and use responses to multiple YIF survey questions as imperfect measures, or indicators, of these latent variables.
Given our model of the cultural transmission of work ethic, we assume that the equation relating parental attitudes to youth attitudes is given by
where η * c and η * p are the latent, continuous work-welfare attitudes for youth (child) and mother (parent) and x is a k 1 −dimensional vector of covariates that contribute to the formation of youths' work-welfare attitudes (i.e., gender, immigrant status, aboriginal status, family background, and parental education). Note that, consistent with our model, x also includes a measure of mothers' labor supply (i.e., employment status when the youth was aged 14), while the k 2 −dimensional vector w captures the welfare history of the youth's family as described above. Unfortunately, our data do not provide a measure of workwelfare attitudes in the surrounding neighborhood. Instead, we include in x a control for the proportion of parent in the neighborhood whose families have ever received welfare.
Finally, conditional on x, w and η * p , ε is a normally distributed error term with mean 0 and variance σ 2 ε , and γ, β, and α are coefficients to be estimated. We also assume that η * p ∼ N (0, σ 2 p ) and that η * p is uncorrelated with x and w.
14 This specification allows us to test the main propositions of the theoretical model discussed above. In particular, we expect that youths' work-welfare attitudes will be positively related to those of their mothers and that growing up in a family with a history of welfare receipt or in which the mother did not work will be associated with having attitudes that are more consistent with the welfare-state frame. In contrast, the welfare profile of other people in the neighborhood has a theoretically ambiguous effect on a youth's views about work and welfare.
14 As will be discussed in the results section, higher values of η * p and η * c represent higher support for social benefits or welfare consistent attitudes. Lower values are consistent with hard work values.
Measurement Model
If work-welfare attitudes were directly observed and measured, we would be in the traditional regression framework. This is not the case and we instead use responses to the YIF survey questions as indicators of these latent attitudes. The nature of our survey questions implies, however, that individuals' responses cannot be used to create continuous indicators of work-welfare attitudes. Rather the data result in ordered, discrete variables reflecting either (i) individuals' perspectives on the role of government in assisting the unemployed (Support for Social Benefits Model) or (ii) the importance of various factors in getting ahead in life. We estimate our model using these two sets of variables independently (View of Social Inequality Model).
To take the ordered, discrete nature of indicators into account, we assume that both youths' and mothers' latent work-welfare attitudes (η * c and η * p ) determine an associated set of latent continuous indicators which we denote by y * cj and y * pk . Here j = 1, ..., J and k = 1, ..., K index the specific attitudinal questions answered by the youth and the mother respectively. J and K are the number of indicators used to account for youths' and mothers' latent work-welfare attitudes.
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Each indicator is then imperfectly related to individuals' unobserved work-welfare attitudes in the following way
where v cj and v pk are idiosyncratic components, all uncorrelated with each other and with the error term (ε) in the behavioural equation (all the variation come from η * p ). The λ parameters are coefficients (factor loadings). Higher values of λ cj would indicate that youths' overall work-welfare attitudes (η * c ) are highly relevant for understanding youths' responses to questions about a particular belief j, views about the level of unemployment benefits for example. The interpretation of the other λ parameters is analogous. 15 We estimate two models. In the Support for Social Benefits model we use two indicators for youth and two for mothers (hence J = K = 2), and in the External View of Social Inequality model we use four indicators for youth's attitudes and five indicators for mother's attitudes (hence J = 4 and K = 5). See Appendix Table A3 for the wording of the questions we use as indicators of attitudes.
As discussed, we do not observe these continuous indicators (y * cj , y * pk ). Instead we observe individuals' discrete, ordered responses to each associated survey question (y cj , y pk ). By assuming that each v cj and v pk in equations 7a and 7b is distributed standard normal, we can model each indicator variable using either a bivariate or ordered probit model depending on the number of possible response categories. These error terms are also assumed independent of all covariates in the behavioral equation (x, w and η * p ). Formally, the categorical observed indicators (y cj , y pk ) are related the latent continuous ones (y * cj , y * pk ) by the rule
for i = {c, p}. In this expressions, the δs are threshold parameters satisfying the restriction 
Estimation Strategy
Our model results in a system of J independent (ordered) probit models, one for each of the observed work-welfare attitudinal variables for youth. To see this, substitute equation 6 into 7a to get
Given the assumption that v cj ∼ N (0, 1), we obtain a system of J (ordered) probits. This system, however, imposes cross-equation restrictions on some of the parameters. Moreover, each equation includes a common error term ε in addition to the common latent attitudes for the parent η * p (which was assumed to be independently normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ 2 p ). We use the software aM L to generate Maximum Likelihood estimates of the parameters in the system and their robust standard errors.
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In other words, our model produce estimates of the behavioural parameters (equation 6) and the parameter in the sets of equations given by 7a and 7b. Since the latent attitude variables have no intrinsic units of measurement, we normalize one λ parameter to one in the system of equations for the youth (expression 7a) and one in the system of equations for the parent (expression 7b).
This identification restriction is necessary to be able to estimate all other parameters. This procedure then yields estimates for 1) the behavioral relationship between mothers' and youths' work-welfare attitudes (γ, β, α), 2) the variance of the latent parental attitude index and the variance of the error term in behavioural equation (σ 
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This estimation strategy allows us to combine all of the information from multiple (imperfect) measures of work-welfare attitudes for both youth and mothers without imposing an ad hoc weighting of the different indicators on overall work-welfare attitudes. Moreover, the procedure allows for differences in the response error associated with each indicator in the measurement model. This is done through the λ parameters which are inversely related to the degree of indicator-specific variance. The disadvantage of this approach is that the model is complex and the resulting estimates can be difficult to interpret (Ribar et al., 2006) .
16 aML uses Gauss-Hermite quadrature to "integrate-out" the common terms in our system of (ordered) probits (Lillard and Panis, 2003) .
17 The strategy also yields estimates of threshold parameters (δs) underlying the measurement model. These parameters correspond to the thresholds in standard ordered or simple probit models. Given our interests and space limitations, these are not reported here, but are available upon request. A visual representation of the model is provided in Appendix Figure 1 .
Results
The Determinants of Work-Welfare Attitudes
We use the above empirical framework to estimate the intergenerational relationship in two alternative dimensions of work-welfare attitudes. The first, which we interpret as support for social benefits, encompasses views about the level of unemployment benefits and the appropriate role of the government in supporting the unemployed (we refer to this as the Support for Social Benefits Model ). The second captures individuals' views about the determinants of social inequality, i.e. the importance of own and family-background characteristics in life success (referred as View of Social Inequality Model ). We explicitly distinguish between these two dimensions of work-welfare views because preliminary analysis revealed that the variation in the data was not adequately described by a single, latent work-welfare attitude.
Moreover, this distinction is consistent with Sabbagh and Vanhuysse's (2006) results which also suggest that preferences for egalitarian redistribution can be differentiated from beliefs about the source of social inequality.
Before discussing the main results, it is necessary to establish if the measurement part of our two models provides estimates that are consistent with the interpretation of high versus low work-ethic (or support for social inequality). In the description of the model we assumed that higher values of η * c and η * p represent low work-ethic (high support for social inequality) and low values represent high work-ethic (low support for social inequality).
Given that all indicators are coded in such a way that high values represent low work-ethic, this interpretation will be born out by the data only if all λ parameters are strictly positive (after imposing the identification restrictions).
18 Table 4 reports Maximum Likelihood estimates of these parameters (λ) for each of our two models.
19
In addition to the specification previously discussed, we also interact 18 For the Support for Social Benefits Model the binary indicators take value 1 if person believe that unemployment benefits are too low (0 otherwise), and if they think the government should take of the unemployed. For the View of Social Inequality Model the ordered, categorical variables take value 1 if people think that certain factor is "Extremely important" to get ahead in life and 5 if they think the factor is "extremely unimportant". The factors are own education, own ambition, having a job, parental education, and coming from a wealthy family. See Appendix Table A3 for a detailed description of the questions we get the indicators from.
19 Estimates of the factor loadings (λ cj , λ pk ) reflect the weight (loading) that the common latent attitude mother's attitudes with the intensive parental welfare history dummy (this is the second column for each of our two models in the Since the latent attitude variables have no intrinsic units of measure it is necessary to set one of the λ parameters to a constant. In this case, the coefficient on the first indicator to unity. The table shows [ Table 4 Here]
Results for the main estimates in the behavioral equation are presented in Table 5 .
Results for the model of support for social benefits are shown in the first two columns and results for views about the determinants of social inequality are shown in the last two columns. As before, numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. (Appendix Table   A4 presents variable definitions.)
[ Table 5 Here]
The results provide evidence for the cultural transmission of work-welfare attitudes.
Young people are significantly more likely to support the public-provision of generous unemployment benefits and believe more strongly that social inequality is driven by both variable (either η * c or η * p ) has on responses to the associated survey question. The higher isλ the more of the question-specific variation accounted for by the common latent variable (see Ribar et al., 2006) . individual effort and family background (rather than say luck or social factors) as their mothers' support for these views increases.
Youths' work-welfare attitudes are also related to the welfare histories of their families.
Young people who grow up in a family with a history of intensive welfare receipt are significantly more likely to support the public-provision of generous unemployment benefits than are young people in non-welfare families. At the same time, youth in families with a more moderate interaction with the welfare system do not differ significantly in their views on unemployment from youths in non-welfare families. Thus it appears that it is the intensity, rather than the incidence, of welfare receipt which is most important in shaping young people's views about social benefits. Interestingly, welfare receipt has a weaker impact on young people's beliefs about the source of social inequality. Those in families with a history of intensive welfare receipt have the same views about getting ahead in life as young people with no exposure to the welfare system. Those with a history of modest welfare receipt are more likely to believe that social inequality stems largely from ones educational attainment, employment status, and family background, however this effect is only marginally significant.
[ Table 6 Here] Unfortunately, it is very difficult to interpret the magnitude of these relationships because the two underlying latent work-welfare attitude variables (η * c and η * p ) do not necessarily have the same intrinsic units of measurement. Our estimation strategy does provide estimates of the standard deviation of the parents' attitudinal latent variable, however, which can be used to assess the relative magnitude of these effects. To interpret our results in terms of standard deviation changes in the latent dependent variable, we calculate its standard deviation implied by the models in Table 5 . viation increase in mothers' support for the public-provision of generous unemployment benefits is associated with an increase in youths' propensity to support these views of (1.134 × .486/1.079 =) 0.511 of a standard deviation. This is slightly larger than the estimated effect of experiencing intensive welfare receipt on youths' support for social benefits (0.393). Turning now to views about social inequality, the same calculation implies that a one standard deviation increase in mothers' propensity to believe that getting ahead in life is closely related to ones family background, educational attainment, and employment status is associated with a 0.117 increase in youths' propensity to believe the same. Although it appears that the effect of mothers' attitudes on the attitudes of her children is weaker in this case than in the previous case, we are unable to make direct comparisons across the two models because the latent work-welfare attitudes of youths do not necessarily have the same distribution in the two cases. We note, however, that the estimated effect of mothers' views about social inequality is substantially smaller than the estimated effect of having a history of moderate welfare receipt (0.178). Thus, cultural transmission from mothers to their children appears to be relatively more important in generating support for the public-provision of generous unemployment benefits than in shaping beliefs about the source of social inequality. In short, young people and their mothers are much less likely to have similar views about what it takes to get ahead in life than they do about social support for the unemployed.
Interestingly, there is no significant interaction between a mother's work-welfare attitudes and having an family history of intensive welfare receipt (see columns 2 and 4 in Table   6 ). In other words, the effect of having a mother who strongly supports social benefits and who believes that social inequality stems individual and family-background characteristics is not compounded when the family also has a history of intensive welfare receipt. Nor is the positive relationship between youths' work-welfare attitudes and the family's previous welfare receipt reduced when welfare mothers themselves do not share these views.
We find no evidence that young people's attitudes towards work and welfare are driven by the welfare experiences of other young people in their neighborhoods. This suggests that in the case of work-welfare attitudes cultural transmission occurs within families rather than neighborhoods.
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Finally, work-welfare attitudes are related to both individual and family background characteristics. There is some evidence, for example, that young women are more likely than young men to favor a system of generous unemployment benefits. This effect is small in magnitude and only marginally significant, however. Immigrants from non-Englishspeaking backgrounds and Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islanders are also more likely to express support for unemployment benefits. This later effect is on the same order of magnitude as a one standard deviation increase in mothers' support for unemployment benefits or having a history of intensive welfare receipt. Moreover, indigenous youth are also significantly less likely to believe that getting ahead in life depends on individual or family-background characteristics. This effect is much larger than that associated with mothers' attitudes or welfare history. Young people are also less likely to believe that getting ahead stems from these characteristics when they have a highly educated father. Finally, youths whose mothers worked when they were age 14 are significantly less likely to support the public provision of generous welfare benefits.
Taken together, these results provide strong support for our cultural transmission model of work-welfare attitudes (see Section 2). Youths' attitudes are closely related to those of their mothers, though mothers' actual work and welfare experiences also play a part in shaping their children's views. Although we are unable to directly measure work-welfare attitudes in the surrounding neighborhood, there is evidence that young people may be influenced in part by the welfare experiences of those directly around them.
Robustness Testing: The Role of Omitted Variables
Our results indicate that the work-welfare attitudes of young people can be linked to those of their mothers. Moreover, this relationship between mothers' and youth's attitudes can be interpreted as causal if the identifying assumptions of the estimation model hold. In 21 Unfortunately, we are unable to account for the potential endogeneity of neighborhoods themselves. To the extent that parents who support generous social benefits or who believe that social inequality stems from individual and family characteristics are likely to live in neighborhoods with a high proportion of welfare recipients, these results represent an over-estimate of the true effect of the neighborhood's welfare profile on youth attitudes. our case, we have ruled out reverse causality by maintaining an intergenerational ordering assumption. This strategy has been used in previous research to identify the causal effect of welfare exposure on youth outcomes (see Gottschalk 1996; Pepper 2000; Beaulieu et al. 2005 ) and seems to us to be a sensible approach here.
More concerning is the reasonableness of our conditional independence assumption. In particular, we have assumed that mothers' work-welfare attitudes (η * p ) are uncorrelated with the error term (ε) in the youth attitude equation raising concern about the potential effect of omitted factors that might determine work-welfare attitudes at a family level. We investigate this issue in two ways. First, our data provide us with limited information about the characteristics of grandparents. We use this additional information as instruments to estimate a model in which mothers' (but not youths') attitudes are determined by her parents' socio-economic status. Although our substantive conclusions remain unchanged, this may be due to our instruments' lack of power in predicting mothers' attitudes.
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Second, we provide a robustness check by estimating a series of models increasing in controls. The first specification estimates the unconditional effect of mothers' attitudes on their children's attitudes, while subsequent specifications sequentially control for the family's welfare history, youth characteristics, parental characteristics, and the neighborhood's welfare profile (see Table 7 ). The results indicate that the estimated effect of mothers' attitudes on those of their children is relatively stable. The marginal effect of a one standard deviation change in mother's attitudes towards social benefits ranges from 0.563 to 0.495 standard deviations, while the marginal effect of a standard deviation change in views about social inequality ranges from 0.141 to 0.114. The stability of these results provides some reassurance that the effects that we are measuring can be interpreted causally.
[ Table 7 Here] 6 Conclusions This paper examines the potential for the cultural transmission of attitudes toward work, welfare, and individual responsibility to explain the intergenerational correlation in welfare receipt. Specifically, we examine whether mothers and their 18-year-old children share similar attitudes towards social benefits and social inequality as well as whether these attitudes differ by patterns of welfare receipt. We find evidence in support of the cultural transmission of work-welfare attitudes from mothers to children. Moreover, there is an independent effect of welfare recept on youths' work-welfare attitudes. Young people are significantly more likely to support the public-provision of generous unemployment benefits and believe that social inequality is driven by factors outside the individual's control as their mothers' support for these views increases. Youths' work-welfare attitudes are also related to the welfare histories of their families, but not to the welfare experiences of other young people in their neighborhoods. This paper makes an important empirical contribution to the mainly theoretical literature on cultural transmission by assessing the role of the family and neigborhoods in the formation of atitudes towards social benefits and social inequality. At the same time, this research leaves open a number of important issues. In particular, while evidence of a direct link between a young person's welfare experience and the formation of his or her attitudes is a necessary condition for the presence of a welfare culture, it is not sufficient. Future research will need to investigate the relationship between attitudes and the education, income, and health outcomes that underlie the receipt of welfare as a young adult. In short, while this paper suggests that welfare receipt as a child does have an independent effect on the work-welfare attitudes of youth, it is not at all clear that these attitudes are correlated with subsequent behavior. Greenwell et al. (1998) , for example, present evidence for the US that the individuals' "willingness to use welfare" is not related to employment outcomes. Moreover, our analysis has been limited by the data at hand to consideration of a very specific set of work-welfare attitudes. Future research will also be needed to assess which attitudes are most relevant for understanding individuals' behavior. Variables 3 to 7 were transformed into binary variables as follows: Variables take value 1 if person answered "Extremely important", and 0 otherwise. Variables 1 and 2 were already binary. n.a.: not available. .469 * * * )
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Parental attitudes x Intensive welfare history .068 Similarly, the expected utility function of a parent of type L can be written as
A parent of type H maximizes (10) with respect to l H . Simplifying the first-order condition gives us
A parent of type L maximizes (11) with respect to l L . Simplifying the first-order condition gives us
Let l * H and l * L stand for the utility-maximizing labor supply choices. We would like to show that l * L < l * H . l * H by definition satisfies (12). Evaluated at the same labor supply level, it is easy to see that the RHS of (13) is smaller than the RHS of (12). Hence, it must be the case that l
